Hume and the bundle view of the self (2024)

The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume

Udo Thiel

Published online:

19 January 2012

Published in print:

29 September 2011

Online ISBN:

9780191730917

Print ISBN:

9780199542499

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The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume

Udo Thiel

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Udo Thiel

Udo Thiel

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Pages

407–430

  • Published:

    September 2011

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Thiel, Udo, 'Hume and the bundle view of the self', The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Oxford, 2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0014, accessed 27 Oct. 2024.

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Abstract

The Chapter begins with a discussion of objections to the bundle view of the mind in Hume's Scottish critics, such as Beattie and Reid. It examines claims that the bundle view was anticipated in thinkers prior to Hume, such as Hutcheson, Bayle, Berkeley, Regis, Boulainviller and Deschamps. There is in fact little evidence for such anticipation. No early modern philosopher prior to Hume seems to have argued for the view that the real nature of the mind consists in a subject-less collection of perceptions or experiences. Contrary to the standard view, Hume himself does not subscribe to this view. Hume does not deny the existence of a self apart from the perceptions. Rather, Hume says that the self, insofar as it is accessible through inner experience consists of nothing but the perceptions and that, therefore, any knowledge-claims about the nature of the mind and its identity that go beyond the ‘bundle of perceptions’ view cannot be justified. According to Hume, the essence of the mind cannot be known to us. Hume is not committed to the view that there is no persisting self beyond the perceptions. With this interpretation in hand, it is clear that many standard objections against Hume miss the mark. This interpretation is supported by taking into account the practical and emotional side of Hume's account as well as his correspondence with his kinsman Henry Home, Lord Kames. Despite their undeniable differences, Hume's position is actually closer to that of some of his Scottish critics on the issues of self-consciousness and personal identity than is assumed by most commentators. The chapter ends with preliminary reflections on the way in which Hume's account relates to Kantian thought on the self. Kant need not be seen as rejecting Hume's position in toto, but instead as completing it from a different systematic perspective.

Keywords: bundle view of the mind, perceptions, identity, Hume, Beattie, Reid, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Boulainviller, Regis, Kant, Deschamps, Kames

Subject

17th - 18th Century Philosophy History of Western Philosophy Metaphysics Philosophy of Mind

Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

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